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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
ASPEN ACRES ASSOCIATION, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
VS. 
SEVEN ASSOCIATES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
12825 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff and Respondent now petitions for rehearing of 
the above entitled cause in accordance with the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Respondent makes the following citations of 
error in the decision of this case. 
1. The decision erroneously holds that an association 
of lot owners cannot be empowered to acquire and there-
after maintain, improve, and protect road and/or water 
systems serving the subdivision. 
2. The decision consistently adopts findings which are 
contrary to or unsupported by the evidence. 
3. The decision consistently substitutes its judgment as 
to witness credibility for the trial court's judgment. 
4. The decision provides no guidelines for the trial court. 
Dated this 2 lst day of May, 1973. 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
About 1960, one Max Bateman began subdivision de-
velopment of a half section of land (the "Tract") in Summit 
County. He filed plats covering roughly the middle half of 
the Tract, and these plats identified the subdivided area as 
"Aspen Acres". So far as the evidence shows, no part of the 
Tract lying north or south of the subdivided area has been 
referred to as "Aspen Acres". 
In August of 1962, Mr. Bateman called a meeting of 
Aspen Acres lot owners. His attorney had prepared articles 
for a lot owners' association, and he induced the owners to form 
an association (Respondent here) ro assume responsibility for 
road and water system maintenance. He promised to clothe 
Respondent with sufficient power to permit it to function 
effectively. In implementation of that promise, Bateman con-
veyed the water rights for "Aspen Acres" to the Respondent. 
He also participated or acquiesced in actions by which Re-
spondent exercised control over the use of the access road to 
the subdivision. 
From the moment of its formation, Respondent asserted 
control over the water system including the transmission line 
which crosses the unsubdivided part of the Tract north of 
Aspen Acres. Respondent further filed all necessary applica-
tion, negotiated necessary easements, and installed necessary 
devices to assure water meeting Division of Health quantity and 
quality standards and to convey the water from this point of 
diversion to Aspen Acres Subdivision. 
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On March 27, 1963, Bateman contracted to convey the 
Tract to Appellant, Seven Associates, Inc. All of the officers 
of Appellant were members of Respondent association. All 
of them had construction knowledge of Respondent's owner-
ship of the water-right and claim of right to road and water 
system control. Certainly, Appellant took title subject to ease-
ments which an inspection of the land would reveal. 
Appellant's recognition of an obligation to convey to Re-
spondent the "water rights and wati::r system including tanks 
and equipment and rights of way pertaining thereto" was ap-
parent from the moment of Appellant's acquisition of equit-
able title to the Tract. There were immediate negotiations 
between Appellant and Respondent in this regard. Respond-
ent's minutes show that Appellant's Walton Farmer came to 
Respondent on May 1, 1967, specifically to propose an agree-
ment which included Appellant's promise to convey the water 
system to Appellant. A form of agreement was prepared on 
May 1, and forwarded to Appellant. According to Respondent's 
minutes of May 20, the May 1 draft was returned to Respond-
ent with suggested changes. Modification was approved by 
Respondent's board of directors at its May 20th meeting. 
On May 22, 1963, there was a membership meeting 
called by Respondent. Both signers of an agreement (intro-
duced in evidence here as Exhibit 15 P) were present. The 
agreement is dated May 22. Appellant's Walton Farmer 
addressed Respondent's membership and stated orally the 
promises which are reduced to writing in Exhibit 15 P. The 
agreement unquestionably bears the authentic signatures of 
Walton Farmer for Appellant and Ken Stahr for Appellant. 
The signed agreement was found in Respondent's files after 
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this suit was commenced. No one except its signers knows 
how the agreement got in Appellant's files. Mr. Stahr, who 
signed for Respondent, was one of the Seven Associates at the 
time of trial. 
In any event, the Exhibit 15 P agreement was a subject 
of discussion and/ or resolution at every Respondent board and 
membership meeting from the time Appellant purchased from 
Bateman until the date of Exhibit 15 P, the total elapsed time 
being less than two months. Thereafter, there is no reference 
in any minutes to the agreement or the negotiations for the 
water system acquisition, and the parties conducted them-
selves in every respect as if the agreement were in effect until 
the approximate date (some seven years later) of the com-
mencement of this action. 
The purpose of this petition is to point up to the Court 
how intolerable is the position of the lot owners within the sub-
division if the Court's decision stands without clarification. If 
we comprehend the decision, it says the lot owners have no 
right to provide water and access to the subdivision, and the 
Subdivision has no duty to do so. Unless the subdivider chooses 
to maintain a water system and keep the access road in repair 
therefore, the Subdivision must simply atrophy. It certainly is 
not politically or economically feasible for each lot owner to 
locate his own water and install his own transmission system. 
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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION HEREIN ERRONEOUSLY 
STATES AS A PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT AN 
ASSOCIATION OF SUBDIVISION LOT OWN-
ERS CANNOT BE EMPOWERED TO ACQUIRE 
AND THEREAFTER MAINTAIN AND IM-
PROVE ROAD AND WATER SYSTEMS FOR 
THE SUBDIVISION. 
The decision in this case appears to declare the law of 
this State to be that an association of lot owners within a sub-
division cannot be empowered to acquire and thereafter im-
prove and maintain the road or water system serving the sub-
division. It should be noted that this Court's insistence that 
a lot owners' association is without status to maintain legal 
action to protect such systems is entirely inconsistent with and 
disruptive of the planning concept under which Summit County 
contemplates development. 
It is clearly a major concern of Summit County (and all 
other counties where resort-type subdivisions are appropriate) 
that a developer will sell out a subdivided tract and then leave 
without making adequate provision for subsequent water and 
road service to subdivision residents. Accordingly, the County 
Commision has enacted a subdiviion ordinance which requires 
every subdivider to cause a lot owner's association to be formed 
and to empower the association to function in the manner and 
for the purpose contemplated by Respondent's Articles of In-
corporation and other organic documents. The specific section 
of the Ordinance to which we call attention is Section 6-E-5. 
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We submit that the responsibility to assure municipal services 
to summer home subdivisions cannot practically be imposed on 
any entity except an association of lot owners in a county with 
a small, dispersed population and a small tax base. In theory, 
it may be logical to impose these obligations on the land sub-
divider. In practice, subdividers conveniently evanesce. The 
county is financially unable to provide municipal services to 
these communities. 
The Court's conviction that the Respondent here is with-
out status or authority to act for the protection of the subdivi-
sion stems, as we read the decision, entirely from its enchant-
ment with the language of the Colorado Court in the case of 
Stanley Heights Property Owners Association, Inc. vs. White-
side, 151 Colo. 429, 378 P.2d 399. We would agree that, if 
one reads just the language quoted by this Court and not the 
entire decision, Stanley seems to support the conclusion reached 
by this Court. Stanley is, however, entirely distinguishable from 
the instant case on its facts. In Stanley, the land owner first 
conveyed easements to subdivision lot owners and thereafter 
purported to convey rights to the Plaintiff which were in-
consistent with the previous grant. The subsequent litigation 
was between the senior and junior grantees. The Trial Court 
held, and the Supreme Court confirmed, that the junior grantee 
had rceived nothing by its grant not because the junior grantee 
was without legal status but because its grantor did not own the 
rights purportedly conveyed. The Supreme Court of Colorado, 
in the course of the Stanley opinion, made this observation 
about the source of rights the Plaintiff was attempting to assert: 
"The Trial Court was of the opinion that the 
Trustee's Deed granted no rights to the Association, 
and that any attempt in that instrument to convey 
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·~ould be contrary to the grant made in' the declara-
tion." 
In Stanley, the property owners association was the junior 
grantee. In the instant case, the association is senior. It acquir-
ed its water rights and asserted its rights of control over the 
road and water systems before Appellant was even incorpo-
rated. Appellant contracted with Bateman at a time when Re-
spondent's claims of right were open and notorious. Within 
two months after contracting with Bateman, Appellant signed 
a document acknowledging the validity of those claims with re-
spect to the water system. 
All of the principles announced by the Court in Stanley 
operate here in Respondent's favor rather than in Appellant's 
favor. It may be that an Aspen Acres lot owner not a member 
of Respondent association has rights which Respondent's man-
ner of functioning doesn't satisfy. If so, the declaration of those 
rights is not appropriate in the framework of this litigation. 
No such lot owner is a party to this suit. This is a suit to 
declare rights and duties as between Max Bateman (and Ap-
pellant as his successor in interest) on the one hand, and the 
association Bateman caused to be formed, to which he made 
promises and conveyances, and which has performed for more 
than a decade, on the other. 
We submit that Stanley is not a controlling precedent on 
this Court even if it held that an association of lot owners could 
not be empowered to act for the community. Certainly, it 
should not be relied upon as a basis for disrupting Summit 
County's planning concept and divesting Aspen Acres Sub-
division of access to water and access to highways when it does 
not support the proposition announced by the Court. 
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POINT II 
THE DECISION ERRONEOUSLY ADOPTS 
FINDINGS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO THE 
EVIDENCE. 
In the course of its decision herein, this Court makes a 
number of statements of fact which are contrary to the findings 
of the Trial Court and, we believe contrary to the evidence. 
First, this Court states that " ... both parties have ex-
pended money for the maintenance of roads and water sys-
tem." The evidence does not support any finding that Appel-
lant has expended money for maintenance of any system. Ex-
hibit 21-D is a collection of checks made by Appellant mostly 
in the summer and fall of 1964. The monies were expended 
(R. 385 et seq.) entirely for installation of water system, 
essentially to satisfy an obligation to provide service to fifteen 
lots as required by the contract under which Appellant pur-
chased from Max Bateman. It does not appear that any of 
the money was spent in the annual effort to keep the road 
and water systems in repair. This is apparent from the mere 
fact that all of the checks except the last of the group are dated 
in 1964. The last check is dated in August of 1967 and is 
payable to the United States Department of Interior. We find 
no testimony linking that expenditure to a maintenance activity. 
Second, the Court seems to conclude that the phrase 
"known as 'Aspen Acres' ", as used in the deeds conveying sub-
division lots and water rights refers to any land then owned or 
later to be acquired by the developer. We submit that, when a 
subdivision plat is filed and a name associated with the sub-
divided area, that name cannot thereafter loosely be employed 
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to encompass an area of indeterminate boundary. We submit 
that, when Max Bateman used the term "Aspen Acres" and 
when Appellant used the term "Aspen Acres", and when Re-
spondent used the term "Aspen Acres", only the area within 
the subdivision plats then on file was intended to be identified. 
There is no reason for Bateman to have assigned the water 
rights in trust for owners of lots within only Aspen Acres if 
he intended to benefit owners of all lots within the Tract. 
Third, this Court characterized Respondent's production of 
Exhibit 15-P (which Respondent acknowledges having located 
in its voluminous files shortly before trial) as constituting a 
"change in its theory." The document in question is a re-
duction to writing of exactly the promises which Respondent 
alleged from the day of its complaint Appellant or its pre-
decessor had made and on which Respondent had relied. The 
location of the document did not change the theory of the case 
in any repect. Exhibit 15-P was offered and received as addi-
tional evidence that Appellant had made the promises which are 
alleged in the Complaint. Before trial began, the Trial Judge 
was informed by counsel of the circumstances under which the 
Agreement was located. Since the matter was being tried by 
the Court, an offer was made to continue the matter if the 
document's late production would complicate the presentation 
of Appellant's case. Appellant chose not to request continu-
ance, and it does not appear that Appellant's presentation would 
have been any simpler if the document had been produced 
earlier. 
Fourth, the decision characterizes the "conduct of plaintiff 
subsequent to the alleged date of execution of the contract" 
as being "inconsistent with its claim that it had a valid and 
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binding contract to acquire the water system." Respondent's 
conduct was in no sense inconsistent with its claim of right to 
have this water system conveyed to it. Respondent maintained 
the system for almost a decade, Respondent improved the sys-
tem from time to time, and entered the unsubdivided portion 
of the Tract without any objection from Appellant. As soon 
as Appellant questioned Respondent's right to exercise do-
minion over this system, Respondent brought suit asserting "a 
valid and binding" promise by Appellant to convey the system. 
The evidence will not support a finding that Respondent's 
conduct has been inconsistent with its claims. 
Finally, this Court ruled that the trial court could not 
properly find, on the evidence, that Walton Farmer was act-
ing within the implied scope of his authority when he signed 
Exhibit 15 P. The trial court's finding that Farmer was acting 
within the implied scope of his authority was based on these 
undisputed facts. 
1. Farmer is the representative of Appellant who al-
ways dealt with Respondent. He appeared at 
Aspen Acres Board meetings on May 1, and May 
20, 1963. 
2. By Appellant's own exhibit ( 20-D), it appears that 
Farmer was soliciting other investors in Appellant's 
venture and that the venture was basically a part-
nership enterprise. 
3. Farmer appeared and addressed the membership at 
Respondent's membership meeting of May 22, 
1963. Others of the Seven Associates were present. 
None challenged Farmer's authority to make the 
promises he is reported to have made. 
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This court does not indicate on what basis a corporate 
officer's authority can be implied. The evidence in this case 
does not show, however, that any of Appellant's officers ex-
cept Farmer acted for the corporation between the date of Ap-
pellant's contract with Bateman and the date of Exhibit 15 P. 
POINT III 
THE DECISION SUBSTITUTES THIS COURT'S 
JUDGMENT AS TO THE CREDIBILITY OF 
WI1NESSES FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDG-
MENT. 
The trial court clearly found that Exhibit 15 P, since it 
bore authentic signatures of officers of both parties to the 
agreement and was found in Respondent's files, was intended 
to be and was an enforceable agreement. The evidence of its 
delivery to Respondent was the fact of its being in Respond-
ent's possession. This Court ruled, however, that the trial court 
was obliged to believe the speculation of a witness that the 
document produced by Respondent had been blown away 
along with some other documents during a meeting in Weber 
Canyon and presumably found after several years by someone 
sympathetic to Respondent's position. 
We submit that the exhibit shows no signs of having spent 
years on a mountainside. It bears a date when both signers are 
known to have been in the Utah Power and Light auditorium. 
There is a history of negotiation of this very agreement leading 
up to May 22, and on that date Mr. Farmer made a speech 
consistent with contemporaneous signing and delivery of the 
agreement. 
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This Court had no opportunity, as did the trial court, to 
observe the witnesses. Appellant's version of how Exhibit 
15 P got into Respondent's possession strains credulity under 
the best of circumstances. Under the circumstances of this case 
(where the record so clearly implies a signature and delivery 
at the May 22 membership meeting) it is error for this Court 
to require that Appellant's story be believed. 
POINT IV 
THE DECISION PROVIDES NO GUIDELINES 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT. 
This action was brought under the declaratory judgment 
statute. The prayer was for a declaration of the rights and 
duties of the parties under the circumstances. The predica-
ment of Aspen Acres lot owners is this: 
1. They must rely on a water source located north of 
the Tract - and that 8 water must be conveyed 
across land owned by Appellant. 
2. They must rely on a water right which has been 
assigned to Repondent subject to a trust in their 
favor. 
3. They must reach the subdivision from the public 
highway via an access road which Respondent has 
been maintaining for ten years. No other entity 
acknowledges an obligation to maintain it. 
The decision in this case appears to say that Respondent 
has no rights and Appellant no duties with regard to the de-
livery of water and the maintenance of roads to and within the 
subdivision. This Court then directs the trial court to declare 
the rights and duties of the parties in accord with the decision. 
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We believe the Court should instruct the trial court in these 
respects. 
1. Does any entity have a duty to assure the delivery 
of water to the subdivision? 
2. If so, does that entity have a right to construct and 
maintain a pipeline across the north portion of 
the tract to the subdivision? 
3. Who are the beneficiaries of the trust upon which 
the water right was assigned to Respondent, the 
owners of lots within Aspen Acres Subdivision, the 
owners of land within the "Tract", or the owners of 
any land which may hereafter be subdivided under 
the name "Aspen Acres"? 
4. If, as the evidence shows, there is not enough water 
for the Tract, how should the available water be 
allocated? 
5. How can the costs of maintaining the access road 
into Aspen Acres be allocated? 
It is vital to this community of significant size that these 
questions be answered and that a declaration of rights and 
duties be made. Respondent is prepared to assume the responsi-
bilities of providing the necesary municipal services but this 
Court says it must not. If it is the Court's belief that neither 
water nor access should be made available to the community, 
the court should so indicate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANK J. ALLEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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